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Summary 
Modellers have examined a wide array of ideal-world scenarios for regulation of greenhouse gases.  
In this ideal world, all countries limit emissions from all economic sectors; regulations are 
implemented by intelligent, well-informed forward-looking agents; all abatement options, such as 
new energy technologies and forestry offsets, are available; trade in goods, services and emission 
credits is free and unfettered.  Here we systematically explore more plausible second-best worlds.  
While analysts have given inordinate attention to which countries participate in regulation—what 
we call “variable geometry”—which has a strikingly small impact on total world cost of carbon 
regulations if international trade in emission credits allows economies to equilibrate.  Limits on 
emission trading raise those costs, but by a much smaller amount than expected because even 
modest amounts of emission trading (less than 15% of abatement in a plausible scenario that varies 
the geometry of effort) have a large cost-reducing impact.  Second best scenarios that see one 
sector regulated more aggressively and rapidly than others do not impose much extra burden when 
compared with optimal all-sector scenarios provided that regulations begin in the power sector. 
Indeed, some forms of trade regulation might decrease the financial flows associated to a carbon 
policy thus increasing political feasibility of the climate agreement.  Much more important than 
variable geometry, trading and sectors is another factor that analysts have largely ignored:   
credibility.  In the real world governments find it difficult to craft and implement credible 
international regulations and thus agents are unable to be so forward-looking as assumed in ideal-
world modelling exercises.  As credibility declines the cost of coordinated international regulation 
skyrockets—even in developing countries that are likely to delay their adoption of binding limits on 
emissions.  Because international institutions such as treaties are usually weak, governments must 
rely on their own actions to boost regulatory credibility—for example, governments might “pre-
commit” international regulations into domestic law before international negotiations are finally 
settled, thus boosting credibility. In our scenarios, China alone would be a net beneficiary of pre-
commitment that advances its carbon limits two decades (from 2030, in our scenario, to today) if 
doing so would make international regulations more credible and thus encourage Chinese firms to 
invest with a clearer eye to the future. Overall, low credibility is up to 6 times more important in 
driving higher world costs for carbon regulations when compared with variable geometry, limits on 
e m i s s i o n  t r a d i n g  a n d  v a r i a b l e  s e c t o r s .   I n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  w e  h a v e  n o t  e x p l o r e d  t h e  o t h e r  m a j o r  
dimension to the second-best: the lack of timely availability of the full range of abatement options, 
although our results suggest that even this will be less consequential than credibility. 
 
Keywords: Greenhouse Gases, Second-best Regulation 
 
JEL Classification: Q5, Q58 
 
Address for correspondence: 
Valentina Bosetti 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Corso Magenta 63 
20123 Milano Italy 
E-mail:  valentina.bosetti@feem.it  
 
"Politics and Economics of Second-Best Regulation of Greenhouse Gases:  The 
Importance of Regulatory Credibility" 
Valentina Bosetti* & David G. Victor° 
* FEEM and CMCC, Italy. Visiting Fellow at Princeton Environmental Institute  
° Director of the Laboratory on International Law & Regulation (ILAR) at UC San Diego, School of 





Modellers have examined a wide array of ideal-world scenarios for regulation of greenhouse gases.  
In this ideal world, all countries limit emissions from all economic sectors; regulations are 
implemented by intelligent, well-informed forward-looking agents; all abatement options, such as 
new energy technologies and forestry offsets, are available; trade in goods, services and emission 
credits is free and unfettered.  Here we systematically explore more plausible second-best worlds.  
While analysts have given inordinate attention to which countries participate in regulation—what 
we call “variable geometry”—which has a strikingly small impact on total world cost of carbon 
regulations if international trade in emission credits allows economies to equilibrate.  Limits on 
emission trading raise those costs, but by a much smaller amount than expected because even 
modest amounts of emission trading (less than 15% of abatement in a plausible scenario that varies 
the geometry of effort) have a large cost-reducing impact.  Second best scenarios that see one sector 
regulated more aggressively and rapidly than others do not impose much extra burden when 
compared with optimal all-sector scenarios provided that regulations begin in the power sector. 
Indeed, some forms of trade regulation might decrease the financial flows associate to a carbon 
policy thus increasing political feasibility of the climate agreement.  Much more important than 
variable geometry, trading and sectors is another factor that analysts have largely ignored:   
credibility.  In the real world governments find it difficult to craft and implement credible 
international regulations and thus agents are unable to be so forward-looking as assumed in ideal-
world modelling exercises.  As credibility declines the cost of coordinated international regulation 
skyrockets—even in developing countries that are likely to delay their adoption of binding limits on 
emissions.  Because international institutions such as treaties are usually weak, governments must 
rely on their own actions to boost regulatory credibility—for example, governments might “pre-
commit” international regulations into domestic law before international negotiations are finally 
settled, thus boosting credibility. In our scenarios, China alone would be a net beneficiary of pre-
commitment that advances its carbon limits two decades (from 2030, in our scenario, to today) if  
 
doing so would make international regulations more credible and thus encourage Chinese firms to 
invest with a clearer eye to the future. Overall, low credibility is up to 6 times more important in 
driving higher world costs for carbon regulations when compared with variable geometry, limits on 
emission trading and variable sectors.  In this paper, we have not explored the other major 
dimension to the second-best: the lack of timely availability of the full range of abatement options, 




In the ideal world all governments would regulate greenhouse gases from all sectors of their 
economies as soon as possible.  That ideal outcome would give firms time to anticipate regulation.  
It would also help prevent “leakage” of emissions that would occur if emission-intensive activities 
shifted from tightly regulated sectors and countries to the more lax zones [Aldy and Pizer, 2009]. 
Indeed, from the pioneering work in this area to the present day, the standard result from economic 
models that examine regulation of warming gases confirms that a global approach is the most cost-
effective strategy [Manne and Richels, 1992], [Nordhaus, 2005] and [Jacoby at al, 2008]. The 
benefits of such a global approach are particularly large when countries aim to make deep 
reductions in emissions, such as implied with increasingly popular goals such as limiting 
concentrations of CO2 at 450 ppm or even 350 ppm.  Meeting such goals, some of which imply 
lowering concentrations even below today’s levels, is essentially impossible without nearly all 
nations and sectors participating [Clarke et al. 2009, Bosetti et al. 2008, Edmonds et al. 2007, 
Keppo and Rao, 2007, OECD Policy Brief, 2009]. 
 
While the ideal world is elegant, the real world is not nearly so accommodating.  Developing 
countries have been famously reluctant to accept caps on their emissions. 
1  Efforts to entice them 
by offering more generous caps—so-called “headroom allowances”—are exciting for theorists to 
discuss but have been politically impossible to achieve in real diplomatic discussions.  The 
experience with Russia (which was given a particularly generous cap to entice its participation in 
the Kyoto treaty) suggests that providing generous caps may actually be counter-productive [Victor, 
2001].     Even if some kind of headroom deal were crafted with the developing countries, practical 
and political difficulties make it doubtful these countries would participate in economy-wide limits 
on emissions right from the outset.  Rather, they will allow regulation, first, in particular sectors 
where they are confident of their ability to administer emission controls; other, less well regulated 
sectors would be brought into a regulatory scheme later on.  That sectoral approach reflects not only 
the interests and capabilities of these countries but also those of the more advanced nations that 
hope to link their trading systems.  They will be wary about allowing trading links to sectors that 
are impractical to monitor and enforce [Rai and Victor, 2009; Wagner et al., 2008]. And even in 
those sectors where regulation is feasible, developing countries will demand delays and 
compensation before they impose limits on their activities, just as they secured delays and special 
                                                 
1 For example, see the Indian position on climate change http://pmindia.nic.in/Climate%20Change_16.03.09.pdf  
 
funding in other major international accords such as on protection of the ozone layer [Benedick, 
1998] and [Parson, 2003].  
The ideal world of greenhouse regulation is one of a seamless regulation that spans all 
sectors globally.  The real world is a messier landscape of fragmented efforts that run at many 
different speeds [Victor et al., 2005]. This paper explores some economics of the second best and 
their implications for politics and the design of international treaties and other regulating 
institutions.  
We look at the implications of three large departures from the ideal world.  In one, countries 
join global regulation at different times and with different levels of effort—what we call “variable 
geometry.”  Variable geometry contrasts with the global geometry of the ideal world. When we 
vary geometry we divide the world into three crude categories—the most enthusiastic (and richest) 
nations that act first, the reluctant (rapidly developing) nations that make the next move, and the 
impoverished countries that don’t emit much and have much higher priorities than global efforts to 
dampen climate warming. As we explore variable geometry we also examine the impact of limits on 
emission trading, which are also abhorred by analysts living in the first-best world but likely to arise 
in the real, second-best world.   
The second departure envisions different trade constraints, ranging from limiting the 
maximum amount of trade to including the possibility of different sectors joining at different times, 
which we contrast with the all-sector vision of the ideal world.  When we vary sectors we divide 
industrial emitting activities into two categories—electric power (which is generally easier for most 
countries to regulate, especially as much of the world’s electric power is run by state-owned 
companies) and non-electric.   
These are gross simplifications, to be sure, but they are useful for our purposes. Indeed, the 
real world of greenhouse gas diplomacy is evolving in this way.  Ever since the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was crafted in 1992, every major 
international effort to regulate emissions, such as the G8 efforts to craft a long-term strategy for 
protecting the climate, has underscored that reluctant developing countries would be expected to 
adopt emission caps only long after the industrialized world “takes the lead” and tightens limits on 
itself [ UNFCCC Article 1, 1992; G8 communique, 2009]. Moreover, as a practical matter, some 
sectors are likely to be regulated earlier than others.  Efforts to reform the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), for example, include attempts to create incentives for sector-
wide policies.  In essentially every country, some emitting sectors are easier to regulate than others 
[e.g., Rai and Victor, 2009].  
 
In addition to varying geometry and trading constraints we also explore a third aspect of the 
real, second-best world:  credibility.  When policies are highly credible then investors can make 
reliable plans.  The cost of emission controls is lower than it would be otherwise because new 
technologies can be ordered and installed with the normal turnover of the capital stock [Philibert, 
2007].  Very few studies have looked at the effect of policy anticipation on the costs of climate 
change regulation. The most recent ones are [Blanford et al, 2009] and [Bosetti et al 2009b] and 
they both assess the negative effect of myopic behaviour on latecomers as well as on climate 
agreement early participants.  In [Paltsev at al, 2009], the focus is more on the effect of policy 
credibility on the banking of carbon permits, with conclusions that underscore the adverse economic 
effects of incredible policies.  Despite these few exceptions, studies of global warming regulation 
have not given much attention to why anticipation would vary and the practical implications for 
policy.  And no study, until the present one, has sought to compare the importance of many 
different second-best factors on economic outcomes.  As will be clear, we suggest that credibility is 
paramount.  Indeed, while this topic is rarely discussed among analysts of climate policy, this is a 
long-standing topic in other fields of regulation and regulatory risk.  Studies of foreign investment, 
for example, have shown that countries that have more credible regulatory policies tend to be more 
attractive locations for risk-averse long-term investments [Vernon, 1971; Woodhouse, 2006].  The 
daily business of diplomats, such as those crafting global warming treaties, is a constant fretting 
about credibility because international legal mechanisms, on their own, are not very strong.   
To examine this second best world—where geometry, sectors and credibility all vary—we 
use the WITCH model [Bosetti et al, 2006].  WITCH is a climate-energy-economy model designed 
to assist in the study of the socio-economic dimensions of climate change. It is structured to provide 
information on the optimal responses of every government, linked through the world economy, to 
climate damages and to identify impacts of climate policy on global and regional economic 
systems.  (A thorough description and a list of related papers and applications are available at 
www.feem-web.it/witch.) The handling of geometry and sectors in such models is widely familiar.  
Credibility deserves a word.  The key attribute of the WITCH model for our analysis is that it 
assumes governments and firms are smart and well-informed and thus forward-looking.  If policy is 
credible then governments (and firms) anticipate its arrival.  We vary the time horizon over which 
investors can look to the future as a proxy for credibility.  When credibility is high the investor can 
see to the distant horizon and anticipate, in 2010, a policy that formally takes full effect in  2030.  
When it is low, the future is cloudy and anticipation is reduced to 15, 10 or 5 years ahead of the 
policy.   
 
 
We begin by describing two baselines—a standard “business as usual” scenario with no 
regulation and then a “first best” scenario in which all countries make comparable efforts to 
stabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at 450ppm.  This second is blissfully optimal in every 
way—firms have perfect foresight, all governments participate, all sectors are included, and 
unfettered trade allows equalization of costs.  The rest of the paper wreaks havoc on that optimal 
world.   
 
NO POLICY AND POLICY BASELINES   
We are interested in understanding just how bad the second best could become. Thus we start with a 
baseline run that projects emissions in the canonical “business as usual (BAU)” world that has no 
new regulation.  Figure 1 shows this BAU scenario for the three categories of countries we will 
examine.   
Figure 1. The Reference (“Business as Usual”) Projection from WITCH.   We include only 
emissions of CO2 from burning fossil fuels and project for three politically-informed groups of 
countries:  the enthusiastic (rich, industrialized) nations, the reluctant nations that are fast-growing 
yet wary at present to spend their own resources on emission controls, and the impoverished low-
emission countries that have other priorities for the coming decades and are not immediately 
essential players in emission controls.  The inset shows projections for CO2 concentrations 










































Then we calculate an optimal path of effort to stabilize CO2 concentrations at 450 parts per 
million (ppm). For this paper we focus only on fossil fuel CO2, but we are mindful that others 
sources of CO2 as well as other gases also warm the planet.  Including those other gases would 
make our 450ppm CO2 optimal scenario similar to a 550ppm all-gas scenario.  (Including forestry 
policy could allow another 20 ppm CO2-eq of industrial emissions by the end of the century.)  With 
the climate module in WITCH, this 450ppm CO2 world is equivalent to 550ppm with all gases 
included. 
2  The resulting radiative forcing is equivalent to about 3.5 watts per square meter; when 
the warming effects of all the gases are included and there is some accounting for the cooling 
effects of aerosols the expected average warming is about 2.5 degrees of warming above pre-
industrial levels. (We do not, address black carbon and its potentially large but uncertain warming 
properties.) This scenario is thus less aggressive than some of the scenarios that are now popular—
among climate modelers and activists, if not real politicians who might implement them—such as 
350ppm.  [Monastersky, 2009]  Such aggressive scenarios are impossible to achieve with second-
best policy that excludes some countries and sectors according to most models, such as for example 
[Clarke et al, 2009].  The rest of this paper examines scenarios that all deliver the same stabilization 
at 450ppm CO2. In order to account for the reduced abatement by reluctant and impoverished 
countries prescribed by second best features, the burden of the enthusiastic countries is adjusted to 
keep global emissions unchanged. 
  To explore the second best we start with an optimal first best world.  In that world, 
abatement effort is allocated across countries on the basis of equal marginal costs.
3 Figure 2 shows 
the optimal level of abatement in this first best world, and Table 1 provides an insight on the 
specific effort required in this world for each of our three groupings of countries in each of the two 
main sectors that will be of interest (electric and non-electric).  
Figure 2. Abatement Efforts in the “First Best” world of optimal regulation.  Main chart shows 
emission levels (below the BAU scenario in figure 1) for each of our three groups of countries.  The 
inset shows the resulting stabilization of CO2 concentrations (including land-use emissions, per the 
standard WITCH assumptions reported in Bosetti et al., 2009).   
 
                                                 
2 Non-CO2 gases emissions of CH4, N2O, SLF and LLF are modeled explicitly. SO2 aerosols are assumed to have a 
direct cooling effect on temperature. Baseline projections of non-CO2 GHGs are based on EPA regional estimates 
(EPA, 2006).  
3 This assumption is not needed for optimality, as trade would equalize marginal abatement independently of the initial 
allocation, but we make it to minimize the flows of emission permits when the market equilibrates.  Our view is that 
large permit flows are politically not sustainable and thus our “optimal” scenario is designed to reflect one that is as 




























Table 1 Emission reductions to achieve 450 ppm.   
Table shows cumulative reductions in emissions (2015 to 2100) below BAU for our optimal (“first 










Power Sector  76%  83%  82% 
Other Energy Sectors  57%  52%  57% 
 
The cost of such an optimal policy—what we also call the “first best world,”--measured in the loss 
in Gross World Product (GWP) compared with the BAU scenario, is 1.58% using a 5% discount 
rate.   
 
THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE SECOND BEST 
  Now we turn to the various aspects of second-best policy.  
 


















  The first element leading us away from the first best is geometry of participation. To 
simplify matters, when varying geometry we divide the world into three categories of nations:  The 
“enthusiastic countries” are mainly the richest industrialized nations that are keen to spend their 
own money on slowing global warming.  Next are the “reluctant” countries whose emissions are 
high (and growing rapidly) but have other political priorities.  Last are the “impoverished” countries 
that have generally low emissions and much more immediate troubles than global warming (table 
2). This approach follows Victor (2007) and the modelling of those scenarios by [Bosetti et al. 
2009a].   
Our simple categories are rooted in these countries’ political and administrative context.  
The “enthusiastic” nations are under internal political pressure to spend their own resources to 
control emissions while also shifting some resources to other countries to help them with the task 
(and also help them adapt to the unwanted effects of a warming world). These countries’ 
preferences for controlling emissions stem from their high wealth (which makes the public prize 
environmentalism and other amenities), democratic governance (which makes leaders attentive to 
public pressure) and free press (which shines a spotlight where government choices and public 
sentiment diverge).  High wealth usually correlates with competent public administration, which 
makes it possible for government to implement broad-based emission cuts that the public demands. 
The “reluctant countries” are all headed in that same direction, although at present they are 
much less keen to devote their own resources to slowing global warming.  Their decisions to 
regulate emissions will reflect not simply internal pressure (which might be a long time coming) but 
also external pressures from enthusiastic nations that are keen to solve global problems and know 
that their efforts will fail without efforts in tandem by other large emitters. Over time these nations 
will become less reluctant as higher wealth leads these societies to put more of a value in the 
amenity of a clean environment, as they learn more about the harms that will befall them if world 
emissions go unchecked, and as the enthusiastic countries threaten them with punishments such as 
trade sanctions if their behavior stays uncooperative.  These countries are usually in the midst of 
building a modern public administration, but those efforts are uneven in outcome.  Thus usually in 
some sectors of the economy the government is firmly in control and able to implement central 
policies; in others regulation is more akin to the wild west.  Governments, knowing that their 
administrative abilities are limited, often try to assert direct control over key sectors of the economy 
through state ownership—which is one reason why most vital hydrocarbon resources and electric 
power systems in these countries are owned by governments themselves.  Government ownership, 
often, translates into more direct and effective administration. [Victor and Heller eds., 2007]   
 
And last, we call the rest of the poorest countries “impoverished.”   They are so poor that for 
the foreseeable future these countries will not be willing or able to control emissions. Emissions 
from the impoverished countries will also stay relatively low, although some of these countries will 
see high emissions from land clearing that is often associated with poverty and poor governance.  
(In the simple analysis here, we exclude that source of emissions.)   
 
Table 2. Main countries in each category and the timing of their contribution to the 
stabilization effort.  (As with our first-best scenario, this allocation is based on the most efficient 
(cost-minimizing) allocation of effort while minimizing the international flow of emission credits.  
The real world will see many more complications in setting national emission targets.)   
Country Target  Example   
Enthusiastic countries 
(OECD countries) 
Immediate target. Allocation 
proportional to effort in first 
best case  
For US. By 2025 30% below 
baseline and 24% above 1990 
levels.  By 2050 77% below 
baseline and 49% below 1990 
levels.   
Reluctant countries  
(BRICs, Transition 
Economies and Oil 
Exporting Countries ) 
Target in 2030. Allocation 
proportional to effort in first 
best case 
 
China. By 2050 70% below 
baseline and 108% above 1990 
levels. 
Impoverished countries  
(Africa and South East 
Asia) 
Target in 2050. Allocation 
proportional to effort in first 
best case 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2050 
75% below baseline and 61% 
above 1990 levels. 
 
Table 2 reports assumptions for a plausible scenario that includes this variable geometry.  
The reluctant nations begin regulating after a two-decade delay; the impoverished nations follow 
another two decades later still, making no effort before 2050. For simplicity sake, we assume that 
the second best world converges immediately to the optimal solution after 2050.  After this ultimate 
convergence all nations make a comparable effort.  This assumption of ultimate convergence may 
still be a naïve one.  Africa was deeply poor a century ago and might still rank among the 
impoverished in 2100, making little effort to regulate its emissions.  But our concern here is the 
transition until 2050.  (The discount rate, in addition, reduces the present importance of events in 
the distant half of the century.) The second best is a world of transition at multiple speeds as big 
emitters become wealthier and more capable.  The policy implications of second best analyses 
related to the speed of that transition and the kinds of instruments that could help accelerate or 
direct the transition.  But it is not a world of permanent differences.  In 1950 Japan and much of 
central Europe were among the poorest nations in the modern economy; today they are rich and in 
the lead on greenhouse gas regulation.  Similarly, by 2050 many of today’s emerging tigers are also  
 
likely to be rich leaders and will accept the regulatory obligations that accompany leadership. There 
is a burgeoning literature on the geometry of participation, and much of it explores scenarios with 
similar attributes [See, e.g., Bosetti et al 2008; Edmonds et al., 2007; Keppo and Rao, 2007, Clarke 
et al 2009, Jacoby et al, 2008].   
 
Our results for this simple, variable geometry scenario are similar to those reported in other studies.  
Assuming immediate and unlimited global trading including offsets—that is, countries not facing a 
binding target are allowed to trade any reduction in emission with respect to their baseline emission 
path—global policy costs are basically the same as in the first best world because trade allows for 
easy equilibration of markets and least-cost solutions.   Of course, the cost for individual regions 
varies with the assignment of regulatory burdens. In our variable geometry scenario, the 
enthusiastic countries pay 8% higher cost than in our first best scenario; reluctant countries incur 
5% extra burden; and the impoverished countries are 49% better off because they sell surplus 
permits and investment opportunities in offsets to the other countries that have tighter regulation.  
This variation simply reflects that in our first best scenario we allocated emission credits according 
to marginal cost while the variable geometry scenario is politically and administratively more 
realistic in assigning more burden to the countries that care most about the problem and have the 
greatest resources to address it, even though this convenient political attribute requires accepting 
greater financial flows across countries.   When geometry is variable the enthusiastic nations must 
spend more so that the overall world emissions stay in line with the goal of stabilizing 
concentrations at 450ppm CO2.  
 
Trade and Sectors 
Next, we add an additional aspect of the real world:  limits on trade.  As a practical matter, 
those limits could take the form of bans or caps on trade between regions, which could reflect the 
desire to limit the flow of capital and to force regulation to occur within particular countries.  For 
example, in the Kyoto negotiations many interest groups were wary about allowing too much (or 
even any) trade because that would allow the rich industrialized nations to avoid obligations to act 
at home.  Trade limits could also include extra costs, such as explicit taxes—for example, the tax on 
the CDM intended to fund adaptation projects—or perhaps high transaction costs from tight 
regulation of offset programs to ensure that offsets are genuine [e.g., Wara and Victor, 2008].  We 
look at both of these.  In limiting total trading, we impose a 15% cap.  And in adding costs, we 
envision that efforts to reform the CDM create a much tighter administration that imposes a $10 per  
 
ton extra cost.  (That number is at the high end of current estimates for administrative costs but not 
implausible.)   
We also explore limits on trade that might take the form of regulations that vary by sectors.  
Indeed, a few analysts have examined such scenarios, often focusing on the electric power sector 
[Sawa 2008].  Such sectoral approaches are important to analyze because even when governments 
are keen to regulate emissions due to internal political pressure or external incentives such as 
carbon credits, it can often be administratively difficult for governments to control activities in all 
sectors.  Moreover, even in countries with highly advanced systems of regulatory administration 
policy instruments often vary across sector.  In the EU, for example, a market-based emission 
trading scheme regulates industrial emissions while governments and industry associations are 
regulating emissions from buildings and most of transportation with wholly different policy 
instruments [Ellerman et al, eds, 2007]. 
For simplicity, we divide the world into two broad sectors:  electricity and the rest.  We 
assume that enthusiastic countries apply  regulatory effort across all sectors.  But the rest of the 
world varies its effort.  This reflects that in all the largest emerging economies most of the electric 
sector is controlled centrally and much of the power sector is already regulated for its pollution 
[Victor and Heller, eds 2007].  Thus if the government is under pressure to control emissions it will 
initially grasps for the levers on emissions that it can control more readily.  And because many of 
these firms are owned by the government itself it is often easier for governments of reluctant 
nations to manage political wariness about new burdens by concentrating the burden on sectors 
where the state is more readily in control.  These administrative and political insights conveniently 
align with the fact that the power sector also offers large leverage over emissions, especially as the 
rapidly growing reluctant countries expand their economies and electrify.   Table 3 summarizes the 
assumptions we will make across the sectors of each category of nations, which are similar to the 
delayed scheme presented above.  We have adjusted the caps (in proportion to the effort for each 
group of countries under our variable geometry scenario) so that this scenario leads to the same 
global emissions each period (hence enthusiastic countries make up for any emission excess 
deriving from the uncapped sectors of the other two groups of countries.  This adjustment ensures 
that all the scenarios yield the same environmental outcome and thus their costs are more readily 
compared.   
Table 3:  Second Best Regulation of Sectors: The Example of Electric Power.  Table shows 
assumptions for regulation of the power sector and other sectors for each of the three country 
groupings.  In enthusiastic countries the power sector is regulated along with other sectors of the 
economy with the same stringency and timing.  In the reluctant and impoverished countries other  
 
regulations are imposed earlier on the power sector, and comparable limits on emission trading are 
imposed on the power sector over the same time horizon.   
Target  Countries 
Power Sector  Other Sectors 
Enthusiastic countries 
(OECD countries) 
Immediate cap   Immediate cap  
Reluctant countries  
(BRICs, Transition Economies and Oil 
Exporting Countries ) 
Starting in 2015  
 
Nothing until 2030 
Impoverished countries  
(Africa and South East Asia) 
Starting in 2025  
 
Nothing until 2050 
 
  
We show our results in figure 3.   
At the far left is a scenario that shows the extra cost in a setting we have already discussed—
variable geometry with a global market with no limitation.  The second scenario, mimicking the 
transaction costs associated with buying offsets abroad as a 10$ per ton C markup, imposes only a 
tiny extra cost on the world economy.   
Restricting the maximum share of abatement that can be covered with offsets causes a very 
modest 3% increase in policy costs. In the short term the increase in costs can be substantial, in 
2020 costs are 50% higher. Though policy costs in the first periods of the policy are still very 
modest, in absolute terms, hence the increment is watered down when looking at the overall policy 
effect. In addition, the early increase in efforts is rewarded by a faster technological progress that 
pays off when, in later periods, the cuts in emission are more substantial (see [DeCian and Tavoni, 
2009] for a detailed description of the effects of trade restriction on the cost of climate policy). 
Restricting permit demand vis a vis an unchanged permits supply decreases carbon permit prices in 
the first three trade periods. In the same period, trade flows also shrink to 20-40% of what they 
would have been otherwise. The two effects combined results in very modest financial flows, 
comparable with the first best case. 
These results are consistent with other scholars who have found that so long as some form of 
trade is allowed for, extra costs imposed by different form of trading constraints are modest.  When 
trade is limited to just the industrialized countries costs increase by just 12%.  The effect on global 
costs of allowing trade in the power sector only is also limited and shows that a power-focused 
regulation would not impose large efficiency losses. The extra cost, however, is small because most 
of reduction that would be bought and sold on the market come from the power sector even when  
 
all sectors are accounted for, as the non electric sectors (notably transportation) are more costly to 
regulate. Thus in a final scenario we also restrict such trading with the electric sectors.   
When all trading is restricted, the extra cost is 12% higher than in the first best world. This 
higher cost is greater than the second-best scenario with variable geometry and unlimited trade, but 
it is still much smaller than the scenario that envisioned loss of credibility.  (All three of the 
scenarios shown on figure 3 assume complete credibility of policy decisions, which is an 
assumption we relax in the next section.)  
Figure 3 Increases in Policy Costs with respect to the first best case given different 
assumptions about international permit trade. Policy costs are measured as discounted 
reductions in Gross World output with respect to the baseline, no policy case. Figure shows the 
increment in policy costs with respect to the first best case.  Starting from left increases in policy 
cost are reported for cases when variable geometry is assumed and: i) all sectors and all groups of 
countries participate from the beginning to the global market without limitation; ii) all sectors and 
all groups of countries participate from the beginning to the global market but there is a $10 markup 
on the price of permits to reflect higher administrative costs; iii) all sectors and all groups of 
countries participate from the beginning to the global market but there is a 15% limit on the share of 
permits over total abatement; iv) only the power sector of reluctant and impoverished countries is 
linked to the global market, until they get a binding target; v) reluctant and impoverished countries 





















































What makes an important difference between the different trade scenarios is the magnitude of 
financial flows across countries. As we have seen, by allowing for a politically more realistic 
geometry of participation financial flows through the carbon market increase with respect to a first 
best world.  (By assumption, our “first best” world allocated emission targets to minimize financial  
 
flows.)  One could argue that minimizing financial transfers associated to the carbon market is an 
important component to keep an agreement simple and enhance its credibility. In cumulated terms 
over the period 2010-2025 the financial flow is 26% of the unlimited trade case when the power 
sector is the only regulated sector, and drops to less than 10% when there is a cap of 15% on the 
share of abatement that can be covered by offsets (very near the first best case).   Put differently, 
limits on trading that have a modest impact on total cost can have a huge impact on reducing 
politically toxic financial flows.  More work is needed to investigate the trade-offs.   
 
Credibility and Anticipation 
  
  Last, we examine the effects of credibility.  As with other modelling groups, we use a model 
that allows agents to anticipate future regulation.  Such assumptions envision that the world is filled 
with all-knowing and capable agents.  Those assumptions are familiar in modelling and reality. 
When a firm develops a complex and long-term plan for expenditure of capital it does not assume 
that most of its managers are asleep, ignorant or otherwise unable to tune their individual efforts to 
the common plan.   But the assumption that agents can anticipate the future is deeply troubling at 
the international level.  International law is weak and easy to disregard.  Often its strictures are 
vague and hard to translate into meaningful efforts that every country or firm should implement.  To 
be sure, there is a raging debate on these questions [e.g., Chayes & Chayes, 1995, Goldsmith and 
Posner, 2005; Guzman, 2008].   But even the most ardent enthusiasts of international law do not see 
those regulatory instruments as such reliable guides for investment when compared with the strict 
system of planning, monitoring and enforcement that is typical of a well-administered system of 
corporate budget planning or a properly monitored and enforced scheme of national law.   
To explore the importance of credibility we vary the extent to which the model allows 
foresight.  We start with a standard assumption of perfect foresight.  (This assumption is akin to 
imagining that information about the future is costless to obtain.)  Then we make the future 
progressively cloudier—and more realistic—until we reach a scenario of “no credibility,” which 
allows for a 5 year foresight.  Five years is about the shortest practical time horizon for crafting 
standard international legal instruments—even in treaties where most countries have a strong 
commitment to serious action to solve a common problem, such as the international agreements on 
the ozone layer—it requires about five years from the point when a negotiating agenda is set until 
an agreement is negotiated and entered into force.  Even that pace is running to a fast clock.  In 
Silicon Valley a few teenagers can invent a company in their garage, dominate the world market for  
 
their service, and cash out as billionaires within five years.  In international diplomacy the pace is 
slower.  
We show our main results in figure 4.  As credibility declines the cost (which we measure as 
the percentage increase in world regulatory cost compared with the first best scenario) rises sharply. 
Compared with the second-best characteristics examined so far, the impact of credibility raises costs 
six fold, which is evident when comparing the left-most point on figure 4 (comparable with the 
right-most point on figure 3) and the results from the “no credibility” scenario at the right-most 
point on figure 4. The most striking increases occur when the model is unable to anticipate more 
than about one decade into the future. This reflects that in the WITCH model (as in essentially all 
models used to assess the costs of abating warming gases) future costs are discounted, which also 
discounts the benefits of perfect foresight.   
 
Figure 4:  The Impact of Policy Credibilty on Regulatory Cost  Figure shows extra cost for a 
complete credibility scenario (left side) and increasingly incredible policies, which we model by 
shortening the period over which agents can anticipate regulation.  The shortest “zero credibility” 
period is 5 years, which is similar to the period needed to ratify and implement an international 
treaty that is negotiated with no warning.  The “complete credibility” scenario is, for reference 































































The lack of foresight is expressed in many ways.  One is the impact on spending for 
forward-looking R&D.  With less time for anticipation, reluctant and impoverished countries would 
under-invest in all forms of R&D.  The additional effort undertaken by enthusiastic countries would 
not make up for this on overall energy R&D.  Figure 5 reports two kinds of energy R&D:   
breakthrough R&D (figure 5a), on which governments spend nothing unless they face credible 
emission controls. 
4 By contrast, spending on R&D to lower energy intensity occurs (at a lower 
level) even in the normal economy where other concerns, such as the economic cost of energy, lead 
to some policies (figure 5b).  Lack of credibility reduces that spending, but not to zero.  In figures 5 
we report results for all countries, but the impact of incredible policies differs.  For enthusiastic 
countries policies are credible, by definition, from the outset because those countries begin 
regulation immediately.  Credibility is most important for the reluctant players.  When the reluctant 
players under-invest in R&D the enthusiastic countries compensate (because they can internalize 
some of the extra benefit of more R&D and because they face a tighter target). In the case of 
breakthrough R&D the extra spending does not exceed the under-investment by the reluctant 
players. In the case of energy intensity R&D, which has a shorter term payoff and is essential for 
enthusiastic country to meet their increasingly burdensome target, it does. 
Figures 5a (top) and 5b (bottom):  The Impact of Credibility on Investment in Breakthrough 
Energy R&D (panel a) and R&d devoted to energy intensity (panel b).  When policies are not 
credible governments do not spend money on breakthrough technologies until the policy appears—
at which point investment surges, although total investment (undiscounted) is lower in incredible 
scenarios than in the credible ones.  The impact on energy intensity investments is less pronounced 
because those investments occur autonomously in the economy and because intensity offers less 
leverage on emissions than breakthrough technologies.  
                                                 
4 In the long term, innovative breakthrough technologies with low or zero carbon emissions will probably become 
available. These technologies, which are currently far from being commercial, can be better thought of as a compact 
representation of a portfolio of advanced technologies that ease the mitigation burden away from currently commercial 





WITCH does not explicitly model turnover of the capital stock nor allow for premature 
retirement of built equipment, but in the real world the absence of foresight may lead to some such 
retirements (although those are politically troubling).  The biggest effects from shorter time 
horizons are in long-lived technologies that need massive R&D inputs, such as carbon storage.  
A full discussion of ways to boost credibility is beyond the scope of our essay.  One strategy 
involves shifting from global negotiations, which are often ponderous because it is hard to get 200 
nations to agree on anything, to smaller “clubs” [e.g., Sebenius, 1983; Kahler, 1993].   Another is to 
invest heavily in building institutions that make it easier for countries to negotiate commitments, 
monitor behavior, and stabilize expectations [e.g., Keohane, 1984]. Such strategies require the 
investment of time and other resources; extensions of the research presented here might explore the 
gains to governments from building more effective international regulatory institutions. Variables 
such as the investment in international institutions might be added explicitly to integrated 
assessment models as an endogenous factor.  Indeed, legal scholars have rested on such arguments  
 
when explaining why rational countries might bind themselves to international strictures (e.g., 
Chayes & Chayes, 1995; Guzman, 2008).  The experience so far with the Kyoto and Copenhagen 
treaties—where there has been much proclamation about the dangers of global warming but not 
much real investment in building capable institutions—suggests that most governments don’t yet 
take these issues seriously.   
For illustration, we briefly examine one strategy that might boost credibility:  pre-
commitment.  One difficulty with all the strategies already mentioned is that they require collective 
action and formal negotiations.  Pre-commitment is something that a country can do on its own—
much like tacit bargaining in arms control where a country can boost the credibility of efforts to cut 
arms by unilaterally cutting arms on its own [Downs and Rocke, 1990; Schelling, 1963].   A 
country could, by similar logic, boost the credibility of international warming regulations on its own 
soil by committing to cut emissions even in advance of a binding international obligation.  If such 
actions increased credibility—by making firms within a nation’s borders more likely to anticipate 
future international regulations and by making those regulations more likely—then pre-commitment 
(as we will call it) could be in a country’s narrow self-interest even without formal cooperation by 
others.    
To provide a sense of what is at stake, in table 4 we report the savings to our three groups of 
countries for different degrees of credibility.  Compared with the first-best scenario, the 
impoverished countries are always made better off because our variable geometry scenarios allows  
them to wait to undertake any action until 2050.  However, credibility implies almost no efficiency 
gains for them as the higher flexibility is traded off with fewer gains from international trade after 
2050. When rules are less credible firms are forced to scramble to find emission reductions.  Less 
able to do that at home they are more likely to buy credits overseas.  A less efficient system also 
implies higher carbon permit prices, which sellers enjoy. Ironically, then, the countries that have 
lowest emissions—which are also most vulnerable to changing climate—may have perverse 
incentives to undermine long-term credibility of international institutions.  But for the enthusiastic 
and reluctant countries—which are the nations that must agree for any climate pact to be 
effective—there are massive gains in efficiency from a more credible policy.  We do not report 
results for individual regions here, but the numbers for China are illustrative.  By anticipating the 
target by two decades rather than one decade, for example, China saves up to 1.2 trillion of USD in 
discounted terms (in 2005 dollars) over the next 40 years.  That net savings comes in the form of 
higher near-term costs (prior to 2030 China’s pre-commitment incurs an extra 0.4 trillion in costs  
 
compared with our “no credibility” scenario), but those extra costs are outweighed by 1.6 trillion in 
benefits between 2030 and 2050 due to country’s early preparation.   
 
Table 4. Change in Policy Costs for the three groups for different policy credibility. 
The first two rows report the change in policy costs for the three groups of countries when variable 
geometry, without any trade and different levels of policy credibility substitute the first best setting. 
The third row reports the differences in present value Gross World Product between the two 



























  As the world’s politicians have turned from theoretical discussions of cutting warming 
emissions to practical realities of how to craft effective diplomatic deals, the analytical community 
is also mobilizing itself to examine the economics and politics of those diplomatic arrangements. 
We are an idealistic community of analysts, and thus we disparage the real world as “second best.” 
But the second best is a world of reality.  We have explored the political economy of that real, 
inferior world.    
 
  We find that the aspect of the second best that has commanded most analytical attention—
variable geometry—has strikingly small effect on the overall economic efficiency of a global 
warming regime as long as there is a global arbon market.  For cuts in emissions much deeper than 
those analyzed here, such second best geometries might be more important.  But in the politically  
 
more plausible scenarios of stabilizing CO2 at 450ppm, variable geometry inflates cost by about 
one-tenth when compared with an ideal world effort.   
 
We also find that second best policies that target only particular sectors may also be much 
less inferior than commonly thought.  Regulatory efforts that target the power sector in emerging 
countries rather than pursuing the more difficult administrative task of controlling all sources of 
emissions in those countries also have a modest impact on total costs.   
 
By contrast, the ability of firms and governments to anticipate credible regulations has a 
massive impact on cost.  This aspect of the second best is most troubling because it is particularly 
hard for governments to have a big impact on the credibility of international laws and institutions 
that require national consent before they enter into force and are difficult to monitor and enforce.   
 
Our analysis is simple and has not turned over many important stones.  We have not 
explored the well-worn question of fairness, although by varying geometry we recognize that less 
wealthy countries will delay their participation.  Allocations with attention to fairness can have a 
big impact on results for individual countries, but we find that our main results—including our 
central finding about anticipation of credible policies—is robust at the global level for which 
particular national allocations do not much matter. The further we depart from ideal world 
allocations of the effort, the larger the importance of mechanisms such as emission trading to 
improve efficiency. However, a larger carbon market and greater financial flows across countries 
might decrease the political feasibility of international agreements. For this reason an additional 
issue that should be investigated in greater detail is the size and type of trade restrictions that could 
reduce these transfers.  And while that issue is important, our preliminary analysis here suggests 
that it will pale in importance to the credibility of policies.  Finally, when looking at more stringent 
climate targets than the 450 ppm CO2 investigated here, then all second best attributes of policies 
seem likely to be even more important—and, in the extreme, can make certain emission and 
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